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Abstract—Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are
frequently used to generate numerous domains for use
by botnets. These domains are often utilized as ren-
dezvous points for servers that malware has command
and control over. There are many algorithms that are
used to generate domains, however many of these algo-
rithms are simplistic and easily detected by traditional
machine learning techniques. In this paper, three variants
of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are optimized
to generate domains which have similar characteristics
of benign domains, resulting in domains which greatly
evade several state-of-the-art deep learning based DGA
classifiers. We additionally provide a detailed analysis into
offensive usability for each variant with respect to repeated
and existing domain collisions. Finally, we fine-tune the
state-of-the-art DGA classifiers by adding GAN generated
samples to their original training datasets and analyze the
changes in performance. Our results conclude that GAN
based DGAs are superior in evading DGA classifiers in
comparison to traditional DGAs, and of the variants, the
Wasserstein GAN with Gradient Penalty (WGANGP) is
the highest performing DGA for uses both offensively and
defensively.
Index Terms—Domain Generation Algorithms, Genera-
tive Adversarial Networks, Machine Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous types of malware utilize Domain Genera-
tion Algorithms (DGA) to produce a large amount of
pseudo-domains. The malware will attempt to beacon
to many or all of these domains attempting to find a
usable Command and Control (C2) server. These C2
servers provide the malware with further updates such
as gathered intelligence [1] or are used as a means
of exfiltration of sensitive information collected from
compromised machines. For the malware to be success-
ful, it only requires that a few domains be registered.
Additionally, to cause the malware to completely fail,
all domains generated and used by the malware must
be blacklisted. This makes the task of combating DGAs
difficult because DGA detectors must maintain a near
perfect detection accuracy.
Recently, Deep Neural Network (DNN) based DGA
classifiers have been developed [1]–[3] to attempt to
achieve greater performance when detecting DGA cre-
ated domains, however many of these detection al-
gorithms have only been tested against detecting tra-
ditional DGA domains. For example, Woodbridge et.
al. developed a DGA classifier using a Long Short
Term Memory (LSTM) networks [1], [4]. Their model
achieved over 90% accuracy with a very low false
positive rate, however their model was only trained and
tested on the Alexa Top 1 Million dataset [5], and the
Bambenek DGA domain feeds [6]. The Bambenek feeds
mostly contain domains produced using traditional DGA
algorithms. More importantly, the Bambenek feeds are
unlikely to contain adversarial DGA domains designed
to evade DGA classifiers. Yu et. al. [2] performed
a comparison of state-of-the-art deep learning DGA
classifiers which included various Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) [7], and LSTM based models. These
models were trained on the Alexa Top 1 Million dataset
benign domains as well as the Bambenek DGA feeds.
Their models resulted in testing accuracies varying from
78% to 98%. However, since these models were only
trained on the Bambenek feeds, they suffer from the
same issues as Woodbridge et. al, e.g. being vulnerable
to adversarial examples.
With the improvement in DGA classifiers, adversarial
DGAs have become prevalent [8], [9] and developed
specifically with the focus of evading maching learning
based DGA classifiers. For example, Sidi et. al. [8]
uses a substitute model to algorithmically perturbate
generated domains, making them more likely to evade
DGA classifiers. They show that their adversarial DGA
degrades the accuracy of various DGA classifier from
97% to 49%. Another adversarial DGA developed by
Peck et. al. [9] uses an algorithmic method that intro-
duces small typographical errors in domains sampled
from a dictionary of benign domains.
With the emergence of neural networks, machine
learning based DGAs have been developed [3], [10] to
specifically evade DGA classifier detection. The DGA
developed by Spooren et. al [3], uses feature engineering
along with an iterative DGA development process to
produce DGAs that can fool DGA classifiers. Anderson
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Fig. 1: Autoencoder and GAN Architectures
et. al. [10] developed a generative DGA, DeepDGA,
which trains a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
to model the distribution of the Alexa Top 1 Million
dataset and generate samples which are benign-like to
evade DGA classifiers. They tested their DGA samples
against a Random Forest DGA classifier [11], and
showed that their model had a 48% detection rate versus
the original 96% detection rate on samples generated
by traditional algorithmic DGAs. However, one notable
drawback to their model is that it tends to produce
very short domains [8]. Short domains can be costly
for botnet use due to being expensive, having a greater
likelihood of already being an existing domain, as well
as likely already being previously generated by the DGA
in use.
In this paper, three different GAN variant are used
to improve domain generation by making the domains
more difficult for machine learning algorithms to dis-
tinguish from benign domains. The domains generated
by traditional DGAs and the GAN based DGAs are then
compared by using state-of-the-art neural network based
DGA classifiers. Our results show that the GAN based
DGAs are detected by the DGA classifiers significantly
less than the traditional DGA domains. Additionally,
a detailed analysis of the samples generated by each
GAN variant is performed to show which GAN variant
produces the most usable domains offensively for a
botnet. As verified by our results and analysis, the
Wasserstein GAN with Gradient Penalty (WGANGP),
results in the most usable generated sampled for botnets
to evade DGA classifier detection while maintaining
high usability in botnet deployment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
dataset to train the DomainGAN is analyzed in Section
II. Our proposed GAN based DGA will be discussed
in Section III, followed by an analysis of the results in
Section IV. Finally, the conclusions and future works
are discussed in Section V.
II. DATASET
The Alexa Top 1 Million dataset [5] was used
throughout our experiments for generating realistic do-
main samples. This dataset is composed of the URLs of
the top 1 million web sites. The domains are ranked
using the Alexa traffic ranking which is determined
using a combination of the browsing behavior of users
on the website, the number of unique visitors, and the
number of pageviews. In more detail, unique visitors
are the number of unique users who visit a website
on a given day, and pageviews are the total number of
user URL requests for the website. However, multiple
requests for the same website on the same day are
counted as a single pageview. The website with the
highest combination of unique visitors and pageviews is
ranked the highest [12]. This ranking provides support
to the hypothesis that the Alexa domains are benign
domains which are not generated by DGAs. Prior to any
experiments, top level domains, e.g. .com, .net, .org, are
removed from all domains. To further understand the
dataset, a few examples of domains can be viewed in
Table I.
III. DOMAIN GENERATION MODEL
Our proposed GAN model consists of four main com-
ponents; an encoder, decoder, generator, and discrimi-
nator. As seen in Figure 1, the autoencoder is initially
Fig. 2: Encoder Architecture for the Autoencoder
Fig. 3: Decoder Architecture for the Autoencoder
TABLE I: Alexa Top 1 Million Dataset Examples
Ranking Domain
1 google.com
2 youtube.com
3 baidu.com
... ...
900,000 aileencooks.com
900,001 alrei.org
900,002 amco.co.in
trained to take an input domain from the Alexa Top 1
Million dataset, encode that domain into a small finite
embedded set of neurons using the encoder network
and then decode the compressed representation back
into the original domain using the decoder network.
After this training process, the autoencoder networks
are then rearranged into the GAN framework where
the decoder network is repurposed as the generator
network and the encoder network is utilized as the
discriminator network. The generator is then trained to
produce domains which are as similar as possible to
the Alexa Top 1 Million domains. The discriminator
model then detects if a given domain is produced by
either the generator network or sampled from the Alexa
Top 1 Million dataset. The generator and discriminator
networks will then iteratively learn how to fool and
detect the other, respectively. This process is repeated
until the generator is able to produce realistic benign-
like domains.
A. Autoencoder Model
Similarly to the experiments of [10], we initialize the
generator network’s weights by pretraining an autoen-
coder to learn a compressed representation of important
domain specific features in the embedded space. To do
this, the autoencoder consists of an encoder, seen in
Figure 2, and a decoder, seen in Figure 3 both of which
are individually inspired by the sentence classification
network from [13]. We note that when not utilizing
pretraining, GAN training becomes highly unstable and
consistently diverges to unusable samples.
The encoder begins by taking a domain from the
Alexa Top 1 Million dataset as input. This domain is
then tokenized and fed into an embedding layer with
39 input dimensions representing the set of possible
tokens, embedding dimension of 39, and an input se-
quence length of 60 maximum tokens. The output of
the embedding layer is then fed into three parallel 1-
dimensional convolutional layers. All three layers have
256 filters and Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activations
[14]. The three layers have a kernel size of 2, 3, and 4,
respectively, which theoretically extracts various n-gram
features of the domain names. The 3 parallel convolution
layer outputs are then concatenated together and fed into
another convolution layer with 8 filters, a kernel size
of 2, and a ReLU activation. Finally, the output of the
last convolution layer is flattened into a single vector to
form the compressed encoder output. This architecture
is visualized in Figure 2.
The decoder begins by taking the output of the
encoder as its input. The input is then reshaped into
a 2-dimensional matrix and fed into 3 parallel convo-
lution layers, similarly to the encoder architecture. The
layers’ outputs are concatenated together and are fed
into another convolution layer. This convolution layer
has 32 filters and a kernel size of 3, followed by a
ReLU activation. The decoder’s final convolution layer
is then trained to reproduce the original domain which
was fed to the encoder. This layer has 39 filters, a
kernel size of 3, and softmax activation. The softmax
activation output represents the probability distribution
across tokens. This architecture is visualized in Figure
3.
B. Generator Model
Once the decoder has been trained to learn to decode
the low-dimensional representation of benign domains, it
is repurposed for use as the generator in the GAN frame-
work. The generator, seen in Figure 4, takes a latent
vector z, sampled from a random uniform distribution
on the interval [-1, 1] as its input, or more formally
z∼U(a, b) where a = −1 and b = 1. This vector is
fed into a fully-connected layer with 480 neurons and a
ReLU activation. The output of this layer is then fed
into the pretrained decoder. The pretrained decoder’s
weights are frozen, and the output of the decoder is the
generated domain. Intuitively, the fully-connected layer
learns a mapping from a uniform distribution to the low-
dimensional distribution of the embedded space learned
by the encoder to produce realistic benign domains. The
generator architecture is displayed in Figure 4.
Fig. 4: Generator Architecture
C. Discriminator Model
Similar to the generator, the discriminator is de-
veloped using the pretrained decoder weights as its
initialization. The discriminator, seen in Figure 5, takes
a domain that is real or generated as the input. The
domain is then fed into the pretrained encoder from
the autoencoder. The encoder’s weights are frozen as
well. The output of the encoder is then fed into a single
neuron output layer with linear activation. The output of
this layer is the probability that the input domain was
sampled from the Alexa Top 1 Million or generated. The
discriminator architecture is displayed in Figure 5.
Fig. 5: Discriminator Architecture
IV. RESULTS
A. Autoencoder Training Results
The autoencoder was trained on the Alexa Top 1
Million dataset discussed in Section II. The dataset is
randomly shuffled and split into train and test sets with
a percentage split criterion of 75/25. The autoencoder is
trained for 400 epochs with a batch size of 64. We then
calculate the mean squared error (MSE) on the test set
which resulted in a MSE of 4.159× 10−6. By sampling
the maximum token probability from the softmax output
distributions we note that the autoencoder is able to
perfectly recreate the test set domains. Examples of
input and output domains from the trained autoencoder
can be seen in Table II.
TABLE II: Example Input and Autoencoder Output
Domain Pairs
Input Domain Output Domain
google google
yahoo yahoo
netflix netflix
B. GAN Variants
After the autoencoder has been trained, the model is
split into the encoder and decoder networks which are
then used as components of the the discriminator and
generator networks, respectively. To train the GAN we
have the generator network produce batches of “fake”
domains with an equivalent number of real domains
sampled from the Alexa Top 1 Million dataset. The dis-
criminator then attempts to determine if the domains are
fake or real. Based on how well the discriminator is able
to classify the domains, the weights of the generator and
the discriminator are both updated using a loss function
and back propagation. It is known that GANs suffer
greatly from instability during training. As a result,
convergence during optimization is generally difficult to
achieve [15]. To combat this issue, multiple variants of
GANs have been developed to improve upon the orig-
inally proposed framework. These variants commonly
propose new loss functions which are theoretically able
to provide a more meaningful metric which can measure
the amount the discriminator determines a given sample
is real or generated. Our experiments provide an analysis
on the task of generating realistic domains by comparing
three GAN variants, Least Squares GAN (LSGAN),
Wasserstein GAN with Gradient Penalty (WGANGP),
and the original GAN, utilized by DeepDGA [10].
The original GAN loss function solves the binary
classification problem of determining of whether an
input to the discriminator network is either sampled from
the real data or generated by the generator network. The
output of the discriminator is composed of a sigmoid
activation which the output can be derived either 1 (real)
or 0 (generated/fake). The objective function is realized
in Equation 1.
Fig. 6: Generated Domain Lengths Distributions
min
G
max
D
VGAN(D,G) =Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)]+
Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
(1)
The LSGAN framework [16] was proposed to solve
the vanishing gradient problem inherent in neural net-
work classifiers with sigmoid outputs. The modified
discriminator output is meant to provide an unbounded
measurement of correctness to more effectively penalize
the discriminators classifications. This change effec-
tively makes the discriminator network a critic instead
of a classifier as it’s able to provide a value which is
more similar to a continuous score than a classification.
The notable changes within the GAN framework are
the replacement of the discriminator sigmoid output
activation with a linear activation and optimizing the
discriminator with a MSE loss function. The objective
functions for the LSGAN framework are provided in
Equations 2 and 3.
min
D
VLSGAN(D) =
1
2
Ex∼pdata(x)[D(x− b)2]+
1
2
Ez∼pz(z)[(D(G(z))− a)2]
(2)
min
G
VLSGAN(G) =
1
2
Ez∼pz(z)[(D(G(z))− c)2] (3)
The final GAN variant we utilize throughout our ex-
periments is the WGANGP framework. The WGANGP
framework, seen in Equation 4, utilizes the Earth
Mover’s distance, or Wasserstein-1, provided in Equa-
tion 5. Due to discriminator network’s output metric
being representing a continuous value, it is commonly
referred to as a critic. The critic provides a continuous
metric for comparing real and generated samples which
is shown to be a more meaningful representation of
comparing the data distributions. In addition to the
change in loss function, the WGANGP framework uses
a Gradient Penalty which constrains the norm of the
gradients of the networks to a maximum of 1, provided
in Equation 6.
min
G
max
D
VWGANGP(D,G) = Critic(D,G) + GP(D) (4)
Critic(D,G) =Ex∼pdata(x)[D(x)]+
Ez∼pz(z)[1−D(G(z))]
(5)
GP(D) = λExˆ∼pxˆ(xˆ)[(‖∇xˆD(xˆ)‖2 − 1)2] (6)
To determine which framework provides the most
usable samples, we generate 1 million domains using
each trained GAN variant and perform several analyses
to assess deployment feasibility for botnets.
C. Domain Length Analysis
An analysis was performed to compare the domain
lengths of the generated domains to the Alexa Top 1 Mil-
lion domains. Generated samples with lengths similar to
benign domains are important for evasion because DGA
classifiers will typically learn features such as length
of domains to differentiate benign from DGA domains.
Additionally, shorter domains increase the likelihood of
a domain collision resulting in a more expensive cost
to register the domain. An existing domain collision
can be defined as the case when a DGA generates a
domain which already exists or is owned by another
entity. This results in an objective where DGAs should
seek to generate samples with similar domain length
distributions as that of benign domains. As seen in
Figure 6, the original GAN learns to generate notably
small domains, even smaller than the Alexa domain
length distribution. However, the WGANGP model is
more visually similar to the domain length distribution
of the Alexa Top 1 Million dataset in comparison to the
other GAN variants.
D. Existing Domain Collision Analysis
To provide further analysis on the effects of domain
length on a GAN variant’s ability to produce a usable
domain, an analysis was performed to calculate the
percentage of domains produced by each GAN variant
which are already owned. If a given domain already
exists then the generated domain is unusable by a botnet
unless purchased from the existing owner. To check the
performance of each GAN variant with respect to gen-
erating unusable existing domains, 1000 domains where
generated by each GAN variant and then tested for
existence online. Each generated second level domain
was concatenated with 3 top level domains, “.com”,
“.org”, and “.net”. As seen in Table III, the WGANGP
produces significantly less existing domain collisions in
comparison to the other GAN variants. The WGANGP
produces 12.3% existing domain collisions, the LSGAN
19.6%, and the GAN 29.6%.
TABLE III: Percentage of Generated Domains Resulting
in Existing Domain Collisions
GAN Variant Existing Domain Collision %
GAN 29.6
LSGAN 19.6
WGANGP 12.3
E. Repeated Domain Collision
Another important aspect to consider when comparing
a DGA is repeated domain collision. A repeated domain
collision can be defined as the likelihood of the DGA
to produce the same domain more than once in a
batch of generated samples. When generating domains
for use offensively, it can become costly to assess
whether a domain is in fact usable. To analyze repeated
domain collisions, all duplicates were removed from
the 1 million generated domains. As seen in Table IV,
the original GAN had the highest amount of repeated
domain collisions at 53.2%, while the WGANGP had
the lowest amount at 7.4%. Intuitively, repeated domain
collisions can be linked to the domain length distribu-
tions of each GAN variant, since shorter domains are
likely to have a higher chance of repetition than longer
domains. Additionally, the results in Table IV conclude
that the WGANGP variant results in minimal repeated
domain collisions at 7.4%, LSGAN at 16.1%, and GAN
at 53.2%.
F. Unigram and Bigram Distribution Analysis
To further compare generated and benign samples,
the unigram and bigram distributions of each GAN
variant’s 1 million generated samples are calculated and
analyzed. Similarly to domain lengths, DGA classifiers
will typically learn n-gram statistics of domains to dif-
ferentiate between DGA generated and benign domains.
TABLE IV: Percentage of Generated Domains Resulting
in Repeated Domain Collisions
GAN Variant Repeated Domain Collision %
GAN 53.2
LSGAN 16.1
WGANGP 7.4
Therefore, if a DGA is able to mimic the unigram
and bigram character distributions of the Alexa Top
1 Million dataset, it is more likely to evade detection
by DGA classifiers trained on the benign samples. As
seen in Figure 7 and Figure 8, we plot the unigram and
bigram distributions of the Alexa and generated domains
ranked by the Alexa Top 1 Million n-gram distribution
in decreasing order. For both n-gram distributions, the
WGANGP framework is more notably able to model the
Alexa Top 1 Million n-gram distributions in comparison
to the LSGAN and GAN variants.
G. DGA Classifier Results
Furthermore, domains generated by each of the GAN
variants were tested against several state-of-the-art DGA
classifiers to assess the robustness of the models to
the generated adversarial examples. The classifier im-
plementations were sampled from [2] and are labeled
Endgame, Invincea, CMU, MIT, NYU, and Baseline.
The original classifiers were then fine-tuned using do-
mains generated from the GAN variants. After fine-
tuning these models, the GAN generated domains were
again tested to assess the improvement of the fine-tuned
DGA classifiers in detecting the adversarial example
domains.
H. Spoofing the DGA Classifiers
The DGA classifiers were initially trained using the
Alexa Top 1 million domains as the benign samples and
1 million DGA domains sampled from the Bambenek
feeds [6]. The dataset was then randomly shuffled and
split into train and test sets using a 70/30 split criterion.
Each classifier was trained for 50 epochs with only the
model providing the lowest loss on the test set being
saved. We note that our train and test set accuracies
were similar to the results by Yu et. al. [2]. The training
and testing accuracies for each model are provided in
Table V.
After training the original DGA classifiers, the 1 mil-
lion generated domains from each of the GAN variants
were classified using each of the classifiers. As seen in
Table VI, all of the models fail to classify a majority
of the GAN generated domains as DGA. These results
conclude that domains generated using the GAN variants
would evade the DGA classifiers that are not fine-tuned
at a high percentage.
Fig. 7: Unigram Character Distributions of Alexa Top 1M and Generated Domains
Fig. 8: Bigram Character Distributions of Alexa Top 1M and Generated Domains
TABLE V: Train and Test Accuracies of DGA Classi-
fiers Prior to Fine-Tuning on GAN Generated Samples
Classifier Train Accuracy Test Accuracy
Endgame 95.86 96.02
Invincea 98.44 98.55
CMU 95.51 95.47
MIT 98.21 98.08
NYU 98.45 98.36
Baseline 95.49% 95.58%
TABLE VI: Percentage of GAN Generated Domains to
Evade Detection By DGA Classifiers
Classifier
GAN
Evasion %
LSGAN
Evasion %
WGANGP
Evasion %
Endgame 98.93 95.58 96.14
Invincea 97.43 94.94 94.93
CMU 99.23 98.84 97.63
MIT 98.90 97.65 97.78
NYU 97.74 95.58 96.14
Baseline 99.63 98.89 97.22
I. Fine-Tuned Classifiers
Due to the original DGA classifiers resulting in low
accuracy at detecting DGA domains sampled from the
GAN variants, the models were fine-tuned on the GAN
generated domain samples for each of the variants
to attempt to create more robust forms of the DGA
classifiers. The datasets for fine-tuning included 500,000
domains from the Bambenek feeds, 500,000 domains
generated from each of the GAN variants, and 1 million
domains from the Alexa Top 1 million dataset. Each of
the classifiers were then fine-tuned by retraining each
of the models with the weights being initialized with
the weights from the original training without the GAN
generated samples. Classifiers were fine-tuned for 50
epochs with only the model providing the lowest loss
on the test set being saved. As seen in Table VII, the
classifiers have lower accuracy than the original models,
however this is expected because the dataset includes
GAN generated domains which are harder to classify
due to their similarity to benign domains. However, the
classifiers still maintain a relatively high accuracy while
being more robust to adversarial examples and more
usable defensively than the original classifiers.
To test assess the robustness of the fine-tuned clas-
sifiers to correctly identify GAN generated domains
as DGA domains, 500,000 additional unique domains
were generated by each GAN variant and classified
using the fine-tuned models. As seen in Table VIII, the
fine-tuned models have greater performance at correctly
classifying GAN generated domains making it more
difficult for the GAN based DGAs to evade detection.
It is also notable that models trained on the original
GAN generated samples still resulted in high evasion
percentages by domains sampled from the LSGAN and
WGANGP variants.
TABLE VII: Train and Test Accuracies of DGA Classi-
fiers After Fine-tuning on GAN Generated Samples
Classifier GAN Variant Train Acc. Test Acc.
Endgame GAN 89.77 89.64
LSGAN 87.16 87.34
WGANGP 83.81 83.93
Invincea GAN 94.79 95.22
LSGAN 92.20 92.84
WGANGP 91.72 92.58
CMU GAN 90.59 90.50
LSGAN 88.03 87.99
WGANGP 84.60 84.47
MIT GAN 93.67 93.59
LSGAN 90.95 90.86
WGANGP 88.73 88.71
NYU GAN 94.55 94.39
LSGAN 91.93 91.69
WGANGP 90.83 90.63
Baseline GAN 81.94 81.89
LSGAN 79.40 79.44
WGANGP 78.14 78.30
TABLE VIII: Percentage of GAN Generated Domains
to Evade Detection by Fine-Tuned DGA Classifiers
Fine-Tuned
Classifier
GAN
Variant
GAN
Evasion %
LSGAN
Evasion %
WGANGP
Evasion %
Endgame GAN 11.01 63.92 74.83
LSGAN 45.18 25.42 72.65
WGANGP 56.43 65.76 34.45
Invincea GAN 3.24 63.69 75.60
LSGAN 36.01 7.82 56.78
WGANGP 50.95 52.54 11.39
CMU GAN 10.84 65.40 76.89
LSGAN 49.44 25.26 74.31
WGANGP 66.77 73.24 37.90
MIT GAN 9.16 65.39 79.37
LSGAN 41.08 16.03 68.97
WGANGP 52.36 59.07 25.71
NYU GAN 6.77 65.61 77.93
LSGAN 43.44 16.30 66.61
WGANGP 55.55 63.09 23.19
Baseline GAN 30.69 64.13 76.36
LSGAN 64.07 43.00 77.63
WGANGP 89.50 88.44 61.77
J. Summary
To summarize the results in the previous sections,
it is necessary to compare the percentage of domains
generated from each GAN variant which are actually
usable by botnets. The main factors affecting if a
given generated domain is usable are “Repeated Domain
Collisions”, “Existing Domain Collisions”, and “DGA
Classifier Detections”. If a domain encounters any of
these issues, it cannot be considered usable. Using the
1 million generated domains and the DGA classifiers
prior to fine-tuning, the probability of a given domain
being usable was calculated. Although the WGANGP
generated domains have a slightly higher chance of
being detected by a DGA classifier, the WGANGP has
the highest probability of generating a usable domain.
As seen in Figure 9, the WGANGP produces usable
domains at a greater rate because it generates signifi-
cantly less domains which result in a repeated or existing
domain collision. It can be concluded that the WGANGP
generator is the most usable as a DGA of the compared
GAN variants.
Fig. 9: Usability Analysis of Domains Sampled from
each GAN Variant
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, three different variants of generative ad-
versarial networks (GANs) are used to improve domain
generation by learning the distribution and characteris-
tics of benign domains, making the generated domains
more likely to evade detection by state-of-the-art DGA
classifiers. Our results conclude that that GAN based
DGAs evade detection at a greater rate than traditional
DGAs. Additionally, our analysis compared each GAN
variant, resulting in the Wasserstein GAN with Gradient
Penalty (WGANGP) producing the most usable domains
offensively for botnets, due to the low likelihood for
repeated and existing domain collisions.
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